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The Wisdom of 
Crowds versus  
the Madness  
of Crowds ‘Trust in Parliament in a post-truth world’ was the title of the Australasian Study of Parliament 
Group’s annual conference in Brisbane in 
July.1 It is a pertinent question at a time 
when populism has been rising in liberal 
democracies and may rise more. 
As David Solomon argued at that 
conference, parliaments like ours are in a 
sense the trustees of democracy and of the 
people’s interests (Solomon, 2018). That 
voting turnouts have been declining, 
particularly among younger cohorts, 
suggests that parliaments like ours are 
decreasingly seen as living up to that 
trustee role. If so, liberal democracy is at 
risk. That is all the more so if the 
information the people are getting from 
and about Parliament is distorted or 
fragmented; if we are in fact living in a 
‘post-truth’ world.
Truth and politics are not symbiotic. 
There is much truth in politics. But there 
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is also much adaptation of truth to need, 
desire, ideology and ambition. Parliaments 
are infused with politics. So truth and 
parliaments in liberal democracies are 
jostling bedfellows. 
In a liberal democracy, as in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, Parliament is the ‘speaking 
place’ for and on behalf of citizens. It is 
citizens’ representative in the power 
structure. It sets society’s formal rules and 
sets penalties for breaking those rules. It is 
ultimately superior to the executive. As the 
‘speaking place’ and maker of the rules, 
Parliament is critical to civic well-being. If 
Parliament falls short, civic well-being is 
damaged.  
A representative democracy
Our Parliament is representative because it 
has been impossible to gather all citizens 
together to make decisions. Parliament 
filters citizens’ views, wishes, prejudices 
and impulses to enable informed and 
workable resolutions of citizens’ contests 
of wills. The ‘crowd’ elects representatives 
to Parliament and Parliament distils the 
‘crowd’s’ needs and wants and, at its best, 
resolves them. 
In its modern form, this representative 
democracy is around a century and a half 
old. In the preceding era of oligarchic 
parliaments only a select elite of property 
owners and aristocrats were directly 
represented. The rest of the population 
– the ‘crowd’ – at most ‘consented’ and 
did so passively; ‘acquiesced’ is a better 
term. 
Oligarchy was thought appropriate 
because the ‘crowd’ – the ‘demos’, from 
which ‘democracy’ is derived – was not to 
be trusted. A.C. Grayling, in his recent book, 
quotes Plato as saying the ‘demos’ was 
‘driven in unruly fashion by emotion, self-
interest, prejudice, anger, ignorance and 
thoughtlessness into rash, cruel, destructive 
and self-destructive action’. Grayling 
interprets Plato as calling the demos 
a numerous body without a head ... too 
vulnerable to being captured by the 
emotion of the moment, by the 
phenomenon of the ‘madness of crowds’ 
which panic or anger can prompt, or 
which demagogues are by definition 
skilled at arousing and exploiting. 
(Grayling, pp.2, 4)2 
In short, the risk of tyranny was 
thought greater from democracy than from 
monarchy or ‘open oligarchy’. Around 
2,400 years later, Lee Kuan Yew, founding 
and decades-long prime minister of 
Singapore’s benign autocracy with 
parliamentary trappings, echoed Plato: ‘I 
do not believe that democracy necessarily 
leads to development ... The exuberance of 
democracy leads to undisciplined and 
disorderly conduct’ (Kurlantzik, 2013, p.79, 
quoted in Micklethwait and Woolridge, 
2015, p.138). Better to hand over decisions 
to Lee’s technocratic elite. 
The term ‘madness of crowds’ comes 
from Charles Mackay’s resonant 1841 book, 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the 
Madness of Crowds (Mackay, 1852),3 which 
documents ‘moral epidemics’ such as the 
tulipmania in Holland in the early 17th 
century and the South Sea Bubble in 
Britain a century later, to which one might 
now add events such as the late 1990s tech 
bubble and the collaterised debt obligations 
which led to the 2008 global financial crisis 
– and, currently, wild house prices. 
The good news for democracy was that, 
as the industrial revolution reshaped 
European and North American economy 
and society and lifted rising numbers out 
of poverty, the elites realised that direct 
representation – what might be called 
‘active consent’ – could safely be extended 
to those rising classes, and, moreover, had 
to be if social order and cohesion were to 
be maintained. The theory that 
underpinned, or grew out of, this evolution 
was, Grayling says, ‘that the ultimate source 
of authority should lie in democratic assent 
and that government should be and could 
be sound and responsible’ (Grayling, 2017, 
p.5). New Zealand was in 1893 the first 
country to take this to its logical conclusion 
with universal suffrage, including women 
and indigenous Mäori. 
The decline of bounded rationality
To channel the ‘crowd’s’ preferences, 
demands and needs into practical 
programmes, parties evolved, with 
programmes and ideologies. Over time 
parliaments in liberal democracies, 
particularly after 1945, came to be 
dominated by parties of the centre-left 
and centre-right, alternating in office and 
operating within informally understood 
policy boundaries which could be pushed 
to the left or to the right but within limits. 
Minority parties outside those boundaries, 
to the left or right or to the sides, were just 
that, minorities. 
This might be termed the era of bounded 
rationality. Most of the people most of the 
time thought the system more or less 
worked, at least while their material standard 
of living kept rising and they felt reasonably 
safe and secure in their identity as one of a 
people in a nation. There was a high level of 
trust, the glue that holds liberal democracies 
together (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Bounded rationality still reigns in this 
country, where a recent survey found a 
marked lift since 2016 in trust and 
confidence in the government, ministers 
and MPs, thanks probably to the election 
of a remarkable young woman prime 
minister (Institute for Governance and 
Policy Studies, 2018).4 But in northern 
hemisphere liberal democracies, the centre-
left/centre-right hegemony has ended and 
with it bounded rationality. That is because 
the material standard of living of a growing 
number of people in those liberal 
democracies has stalled or fallen or become 
insecure, and/or they feel that migrants 
and other intrusions from outside, such as 
Bounded rationality still reigns in this 
country, where a recent survey found 
a marked lift since 2016 in trust and 
confidence in the government, ministers 
and MP ...
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hyperglobalisation, are unstitching the 
fabric of what they think of as ‘their’ ‘nation’. 
As a result, they no longer feel represented 
by, nor do they trust, the centre-left/centre-
right cabal. They see these parties as agents 
of a self-perpetuating, detached elite: the 
‘other’, not ‘us’; those who are ‘there’ not 
‘here’, to paraphrase David Goodhart 
(Goodhart, 2017).5 
The vehicles of protest range from the 
far right to the far left to the oddball (as in 
Italy) and from parties or movements to 
demagogues such as Boris Johnson or 
Donald Trump, or fresh-faced saviours 
such as Emmanuel Macron.6 In the still 
new post-1990 democracies of eastern 
Europe, autocracy is on the rise, supported 
by voting majorities (in part the result of 
liberals having left for western Europe after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union) (Krastev, 
2018, pp.54–5). Some autocratic regimes 
in the Middle East have widespread popular 
backing (Fromer, 2018).7 
In the established liberal democracies 
the parties posing as alternatives to the elite 
appeal more for what they are against than 
what they purport to be for, except where 
they promise the restoration of ‘order’. 
Even where old centre-left and centre-right 
parties seem to be still running the show, 
as in Britain and the United States, those 
parties are deeply, possibly existentially, 
riven: within those parties the moderate 
liberal-social democratic centre-left and 
moderate liberal-conservative centre-right, 
the upholders of liberal democracy, are in 
eclipse. The May/June issue of Foreign 
Affairs asked on its front cover, ‘Is 
Democracy Dying?’8 Books and articles in 
this vein are multiplying. 
In short, in liberal democracies the 
‘crowd’ is no longer moderated by 
moderate parties. The ‘elites’ accordingly 
are agitated. 
In his book Grayling charts first the 
birth and evolution of liberal democracy, 
then its descent into what he sees as failure. 
His three main reasons for ‘why 
representative democracy has failed to 
deliver on the promise of its design’ are: the 
redirection of the system by those who take 
control in the interests of their class or 
party; failure to educate the ‘demos’; and 
‘interference and manipulation by agencies 
with partisan interests ... to get the 
democracy to deliver their preferred 
outcomes’ (Grayling, 2017, p.133).
Grayling ends on Brexit, condemning 
the bumbling mishandling by an elitist 
cabinet of what its toff prime minister 
asserted was an advisory, non-binding 
referendum. But Grayling’s Anglocentricity 
blinds him to what a quick check with 
Switzerland or even New Zealand could 
have taught David Cameron about 
referendums, notably to do them in stages 
with opportunity for reflection, which 
might have resulted in a Remain vote. 
Anglocentric Grayling wants referendums 
abolished or at most subjected to a 
supermajority. He does not see they could 
be usefully refined. 
Grayling’s other Anglocentric 
shortsightedness is to predicate his book 
on representative democracy as if that is 
what democracy is. It isn’t. Representation 
is only one channel through which the 
demos – the ‘crowd’ – can exercise – and 
moderate – its will. 
Other ways of doing democracy
There have long been, and now there is 
a growing number of, alternative ways 
to express opinion, to develop ways of 
thinking, to assemble and assess evidence, 
to build coalitions, to work through 
competing options for action, reach 
consensus or a majority agreement and 
mandate action. These have ranged from 
riots and organised protest, through 
petitions that attract support from the 
‘crowd’, to pressure and interest groups, 
constitutional conventions and, more 
recently, citizens-initiated referendums, 
citizens assemblies and juries, expert 
working groups and collaborative 
governance consensus-seeking by 
competing interest groups. Some of these 
are sanctioned by Parliament, some not. 
That some are not sanctioned highlights 
a core characteristic of representative 
democracy: that, apart from periodic 
elections, it operates only by the ‘consent’ 
or ‘acquiescence’ of the ‘crowd’ and 
that consent can be, and occasionally is, 
withdrawn or made conditional. (The 
same goes, by the way, for autocracy.) 
The turn to populism in northern 
liberal democracies amounts to at least a 
partial withdrawal of consent and 
acquiescence. This has happened before 
from time to time in liberal democracies, 
most tragically in the swing from the 
Weimar Republic to Nazism in the early 
1930s. But the latest populist surge has 
some distinct characteristics. 
One is the breadth of reaction across 
many countries, most recently Sweden, 
which for decades was the liberal-democratic 
archetype. The other is the new mechanisms 
digital technology has made available to the 
‘crowd’ and to those who seek to feed on and 
influence the ‘crowd’. Far more populous 
‘crowds’ can be reached and can interact 
across far greater distances than in the pre-
digital era, and those connections are made 
faster than lightning. And the larger the 
crowd, the more irrational its members can 
be. We are still learning the implications for 
everyday life of that connectedness. Also, 
what the ‘crowds’ say about themselves and 
to others can be harvested and processed by 
artificial intelligence computers – and 
misused – in ways 20th-century statisticians 
and marketers – and crooks – could only 
dream of. 
The new-era robber barons, Facebook, 
Google, Amazon and other social 
media, have sucked much of the 
advertising lifeblood out of traditional 
media and by doing that have 
diminished the role of traditional 
media’s fact-seeking journalists. 
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As a swelling flow of new books under-
lines,9 these new technologies have wreaked 
serious damage on the keeper of ‘truth’, the 
fourth estate, which provided channels of 
information to and from the citizens and 
their representatives and so was a check on 
Parliament, however imperfect. The new-
era robber barons, Facebook, Google, 
Amazon and other social media, have 
sucked much of the advertising lifeblood 
out of traditional media and by doing that 
have diminished the role of traditional 
media’s fact-seeking journalists. They 
channel ‘news’ according to their users’ 
clicks, reinforcing preference, prejudice 
and preconception. They carry bots: 
automated accounts which autonomously 
spread messages (astroturfing), amplify 
allies’ messages (propaganda) and dampen 
opponents’ messages (roadblocking). An 
Illinois University study found that during 
the 2016 United States election a fifth of 
election-related Twitter messages were 
generated by such bots. 
As a result, real news is garbled and the 
spread of ‘fake’ news is enabled. That is the 
antithesis of truth and the enemy of the 
trust on which representative democracy 
depends. It fuels what Jamie Bartlett in The 
People vs Tech calls ‘hyperpartisan’ group 
loyalty to parties or demagogues or biases 
(Bartlett, 2018, p.43).10 Bartlett sees digital 
technology as incompatible with 
democracy and says it is set to destroy 
democracy if politicians don’t bring it 
under control. 
Facebook and the other robber barons 
also harvest personal data, which can then 
be processed by artificial intelligence to 
target bots. This can be used by political 
consultants and their clients, and by hostile 
governments or crooks to distort voting, as 
in the United States presidential election 
and the Brexit referendum. Add in the 
hacking of emails and websites and the 
malign use of digital technology. Represent-
ative democracy and its parliaments face 
potentially existential threats.
That’s the bad news: the fuelling of a 
fulsome ‘madness of crowds’ with distorted, 
fabricated and malicious ideas. This is the 
‘post-truth’. 
Moreover, this digitised world is the 
one younger people – the 20-somethings 
and younger – have grown up with. They 
think differently, cohort by cohort. The 
under-20s are different from the over-20s 
and both think differently from the 
30-somethings. And the under-10s? Don’t 
ask. Representative democracy is less 
central to the under-30s’ lives, thinking, 
expectations and hopes than to older 
cohorts’. Unsurprisingly, voter turnout in 
elections has declined here and in other 
democracies (at least where voting is not 
compulsory). 
The good news
But there is also good news. The new media 
and the other threads of the web also 
can and do enable and fuel a ‘wisdom of 
crowds’. They enable participation in ways 
that in the past were difficult to organise 
or not even imaginable. Might those ways 
of ‘collective problem solving’ deliver for 
politics what the peer-to-peer commons 
does in generating Wikipedia entries, or 
what a swarm of brains ‘hived’ (Bartlett’s 
word) by the internet can do in finding 
solutions to complex digital technology 
issues, as described by Nigel Shadbolt 
and Roger Hampson in The Digital Ape 
(Shadbolt and Hanson, 2018)?11 
There is ‘crowd funding’ of new 
business startups, charities and other 
ventures. In 2016 an iconic beach was 
rescued into public ownership through a 
website which the ‘crowd’ could join and 
contribute funds to. Pressure groups which 
used to organise through in-person 
meetings now operate digitally – as, for 
example, two justice reform groups, 
JustSpeak and People Against Prisons. 
Informal movements can be much more 
easily generated, as in the overthrow of the 
Egyptian regime in 2011 or the #MeToo 
movement exposing sexual harassment. 
The misnamed ‘Arab spring’ was transitory. 
We have yet to see whether #MeToo evolves 
into a durable, influential political force. 
But they do appear to be pointing to the 
development, however unevenly, of 
alternative ways of doing democracy.
I term this ‘distributed democracy’ 
(James, 2017b, pp.252, 254), by analogy 
with distributed generation of electricity 
by householders, small groups, factories 
and building managers through 
photovoltaic cells, biofuels, wind micro-
turbines and combined generation using 
processing heat and feeding that back into 
the grid. Shadbolt and Hampson call it 
‘liquid’ or ‘delegative democracy’ (Shadbolt 
and Hampson, 2018, p.118). 
The good news for parliaments is 
twofold. First, even with distributed 
electricity generation the need persists for 
big generators and a grid. Likewise, for as 
long as there are sovereign nation states, 
maintaining social order needs central 
authority and assignment of power and so 
a national legislature and government. (I 
leave aside here the argument that cities 
will, or may, over time take over much of 
what states do, which I explored in a talk 
late last year (James, 2017a).) 
Second, while distributed democracy 
leaves room for ‘madness of crowds’, it also 
makes room for ‘wisdom of crowds’, and 
that wisdom can be superior to leaders’ 
assumed wisdom. That distributed wisdom 
can apply even in autocracies which claim 
that all wisdom lies in the centre, as, for 
example, China’s emperor, Xi Jinping, does. 
For any regime to endure it needs to be 
attentive to the ‘crowd’s’ needs, desires, 
attitudes, moods and currents. The 
difference is that in democracies the leaders’ 
hold on power is likely to be shorter than 
in autocracies, so those leaders – and their 
parliaments – need to be more attentive 
and responsive to the ‘crowd’. 
... while distributed democracy leaves 
room for ‘madness of crowds’, it also 
makes room for ‘wisdom of crowds’, and 
that wisdom can be superior to leaders’ 
assumed wisdom.
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So we might say democracy is an 
interplay, a tension between the ‘madness 
of crowds’ and the ‘wisdom of crowds’. 
Both have always been in play. Liberal 
democracy works well when the ‘wisdom’ 
prevails over the ‘madness’, as it did in 
liberal democracies during the six decades 
when the bounded rationality of the 
centre-right/centre-left hegemony pre-
vailed, and with it, stability. But over the 
past decade or so the ‘madness of crowds’ 
has been rising, aided by digital technology. 
This fragments or degrades liberal 
democracy. Freedom House, which 
monitors the rise and fall of democracy, 
reports that 2017 was the 12th consecutive 
year of ‘decline in global freedom’, not least 
in that self-proclaimed bastion of modern 
democracy, the United States (Abramowitz, 
2018).12 
Is this surprising? After all, the Vasco da 
Gama era, the 500-year Euro-American 
dominance of the global economy and 
politics, has ended and with it the Euro-
American dominance of ideas, in new 
science and of how to organise societies, 
their economies and their politics. China 
and India, both reclaiming their pre-da 
Gama eminence, along with other emerging 
centres of power are bidding for leadership 
in science and societal and political 
organisation (Kaplan, 2018).13 Sure, the 
trend of the past 200 years or so has been 
towards liberal democracy. But the recent 
lapse noted by Freedom House cannot be 
assumed to be temporary. Xi Jinping, 
Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orban and Recep 
Erdog˘an and their devotees have ambitions 
directly contradictory to liberal democracy. 
That’s the gloomy trend. But in liberal 
democracies, ‘madness’ has not vanquished 
‘wisdom’. The foundations are still sound 
even if the superstructure needs repairs. 
A case for optimism
So is there a counter-trend? 
Here’s a wild idea. The monarchies and 
autocracies which were upended by the 
revolutions of 1848 across continental 
Europe quickly re-established their 
authority. But some undercurrents 
continued to flow and decades later – in 
some cases up to a century and a quarter 
later – those undercurrents rose to the 
surface in the form of representative 
democracies. So were there undercurrents 
in the 1968 wave of unrest which swept 
throug h l ibera l  democrac ies , 
Czechoslovakia and in a muted form 
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain? And, if 
so, are there elements of those undercur-
rents that promise the rescue or redevelop-
ment of liberal democracy? Candidates 
include peace, individuality combined with 
communal inter-responsibility, freedom 
and equality of human rights, and even a 
‘new leftism’. But even if such undercurrents 
are flowing, which cohort will bring them 
to the surface: the 30-somethings or the 
20-somethings or the under-20s? And will 
that be too late to rescue liberal democracy 
from the growing cancer of the ‘madness 
of crowds’ and the rising pressure of 
alternatives such as Xi Jinping’s? 
It is too early to address, let alone answer 
those questions. Any answers may rest on 
too flimsy a hypothesis. But there is a case 
for optimism. The Canadian cognitive 
psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker has 
presented mountain ranges of evidence that 
humans across most of the world are 
treating each other better century by century 
and decade by decade: hugely less poverty, 
hugely less untreatable disease, even less war 
and homicide (in liberal democracies), 
underpinned by greater personal freedom 
and rights (Pinker, 2011, 2018). That points 
not to the triumph of autocracy but towards 
something that might look more like a 
descendant or outgrowth of, or migration 
towards, liberal democracy. 
One reason we have become despondent 
and why large minorities have turned away 
from liberal democracy is the relentlessly 
negative tone of the traditional media. We 
play up the bad, the disgusting, the violent, 
the worst side of human nature. We think 
that is what readers/listeners/viewers want. 
Entertainment trumps information. That 
negative tone was no better encapsulated 
than in the first words of the New York 
Times’ emailed weekend briefing of 20 May 
on the royal wedding: ‘Let’s start with some 
good news for a change.’ 
Pinker overstates his case. But the 
underlying point, I think, has merit. If so, 
there is life and value yet in liberal 
democracies – upsides worth developing, 
including in the capacity for distributed 
democracy to build the ‘wisdom of crowds’. 
Parliament’s need to pick up its game
If that is to be so, parliaments will be critical 
to building the wisdom and quelling the 
madness. As the law-making meeting 
places, the ‘places to talk’, parliaments 
can take initiatives that can influence the 
course of debate, argument and resolution. 
A quick list for the New Zealand Parliament 
might go something like this: 
First, stamp out bad behaviour. 
Question time (despite some innovative 
attempts at corrective action by Speaker 
Mallard) is a disgrace, to Parliament and 
the nation. It is a sufficient reason not to 
vote, or at least not to vote for incumbents. 
Partisanship cannot be eliminated because 
politics begets tribes with different 
ambitions for themselves, their supporters 
and the country. But airing those 
differences should be by principled debate, 
not snide, personalised, denigrating and 
partisan argument and catcalling. 
Second, rework debate in a much 
strengthened committee structure to get 
more focus on improving legislation and 
informing it with disinterested expert, 
especially scientific, evidence. 
Chris Hipkins’ glib dismissal on  
6 September of the Appropriations 
Review Committee report on resourcing 
MPs (Appropriations Review Committee, 
2018) as ‘dead in the water’ demeaned 
Parliament in a way that invites distrust.
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Third, help MPs behave more like the 
responsible representatives they need to be 
by beefing up resources: good salaries; 
more administrative support in Parliament 
and in electorates or, in the case of list MPs, 
in the area they choose as their base; strong 
research support, including funded access 
to private and academic experts and 
scientists for evidence; and access to 
departmental advice. 
Chris Hipkins’ glib dismissal on 6 
September of the Appropriations Review 
Committee report on resourcing MPs 
(Appropriations Review Committee, 2018) 
as ‘dead in the water’ demeaned Parliament 
in a way that invites distrust. Hipkins’ title, 
leader of house, suggests he is the guardian 
of Parliament, but actually he was acting 
as an officer of the executive, lording it over 
MPs and Parliament. For as long as this 
overlordship persists, Parliament will earn 
its growing disrepute. Mindless media 
carping at Simon Bridges doing his proper 
job going round the country listening and 
Jacinda Ardern participating in the 
strategically important South Pacific 
Forum doesn’t help. 
Fourth, reduce voter cynicism about 
who really runs the show (shadowy figures 
behind political parties) by greatly 
increasing public funding of political 
parties and tightening rules limiting 
private donations, and requiring 
information on donations to be widely 
distributed publicly, by way of social media, 
so people who don’t normally engage in 
politics see who is paying whom. 
Fifth, related to that, generously 
publicly fund something like Radio New 
Zealand to produce a platform of factual, 
fact-checked information that other 
serious media, and even social media, can 
draw on. Also, publicly subsidise selected 
serious media websites, such as Newsroom. 
Sixth, related to that, start looking for 
ways to mandate the curation of social 
media and hold the curators to account. 
Obvious mechanisms are tax and 
regulation, but regulators will need to be 
very nimble, fast and innovative to keep up 
with changes in technologies, algorithms 
and platforms. That means competing on 
price with the tech industry. 
Seventh, set up an independent fiscal 
commission appointed by the whole of 
Parliament and convert some other 
commissions into parliamentary com-
missions similarly appointed. That could 
include, for example, the Human Rights 
Commission and the planned Climate 
Commission, among others. But first 
rewrite the appointment, dismissal and 
oversight rules of such commissions to 
ensure proper, open, just process. 
Engaging the ‘crowd’
Eighth, adopt the principle of subsidiarity 
and enable and mandate local councils to 
take more power and do more.14 Councils 
vary greatly in quality but they are closer 
to their segments of the ‘crowd’. If well 
resourced, councils might prove able to 
develop internet-based ways of engaging 
and drawing from the ‘crowd’ positively 
to develop ‘wise’ policies and programmes 
the ‘crowd’ can see, respect and value as 
relevant and can see are not the preserve of 
a distant elite. Parliament could learn from 
such experiments and innovations. 
So, ninth, following on from that, start 
to take Parliament and decision making to 
the people, through innovative use of 
digital technology to inform, consult, 
engage and involve voters in more complex 
decisions than binary yes–no referendums. 
That could mean taking collaborative 
governance, citizens juries and assemblies 
and deliberative polling much wider than 
small samples and securing voter responses 
with blockchain technology to encourage 
interaction. 
How far could that go? Nigel Shadbolt 
and Roger Hampson muse on ‘citizen 
internet panels’, and even a ‘national panel’ 
comprising millions of people. ‘Decisions 
that affect a lot of people should involve a 
lot of people,’ they say, even suggesting that 
‘new legislation, in principle, could be 
crowd-sourced’ (Shadbolt and Hampson, 
2018, pp.304–5). Jamie Bartlett offers a 
long list of aspirational corrective measures, 
including reining in and fully taxing the 
digital giants like Google, Facebook, 
Amazon and Apple and ‘policing the 
algorithms’ (Bartlett, 2018, p.207ff). 
To a fading baby boomer like me the 
Shadbolt–Hampson musings stray into 
science fiction territory. But in the digital 
world much that was science fiction 40 or 
50 years ago is fact now. Why not new ways 
of doing democracy if the alternative is 
outdated, outmanoeuvred, outsmarted and 
illegitimate parliaments? We in liberal 
democracies need parliaments, to focus 
politics and ideas and execute policies and 
decisions. But those parliaments need to 
be modern, as they learnt they needed to 
be in the 19th century when the aristocracy 
and upper classes were challenged by the 
merchant and industrial classes and a new 
industrial working class. 
How all this evolves – and especially 
whether facts and common sense, which 
are the nearest we can get to ‘truth’ in 
politics, prevail – will be a large factor in 
the evolution of trust in Parliament. 
The fundamental point is that 
democracy is the property of the demos 
and the optimist in me says that ultimately 
the decisions the demos makes rest on the 
‘wisdom of crowds’. There is room for 
optimism that the wisdom of the crowds 
might yet trump the madness of the crowds. 
If so, liberal democracy has a way to go yet.
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